Does Earl Conee's Argument About The Existence Of Universal Beg The Question?

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Does Earl Conee's Argument about the Existence of Universals Beg the Question?

In the realm of metaphysics, the concept of universals has been a subject of debate among philosophers for centuries. Universals refer to abstract entities that are thought to exist independently of individual objects, such as properties, relations, and concepts. Earl Conee, a prominent philosopher, has argued that universals exist, but his argument has been met with skepticism by some. In this article, we will examine Conee's argument and determine whether it begs the question.

Earl Conee's argument for the existence of universals can be found in his book, "Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics," co-authored with Theodore Sider. On page 160, Conee writes:

"Here is one last argument for the existence of universals. Suppose that there are no universals. Then, for any property, there is no universal that is that property. But then, for any property, there is no universal that is that property, and so on. This is a contradiction, since it implies that there is no universal that is any property. Therefore, there must be universals."

At first glance, Conee's argument appears to be a simple and straightforward proof for the existence of universals. However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the argument is not as convincing as it seems. The argument relies on a series of assumptions and inferences that are not necessarily justified.

One of the main problems with Conee's argument is that it assumes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain the concept of properties. However, this assumption is not necessarily true. There are alternative explanations for the concept of properties that do not rely on the existence of universals.

One of the most significant criticisms of Conee's argument is that it begs the question. Begging the question is a fallacy of reasoning in which the argument assumes the truth of the very thing it is trying to prove. In this case, Conee's argument assumes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain the concept of properties, but this assumption is precisely what is being questioned.

The liar paradox is a classic example of a self-referential paradox that can be used to illustrate the problem of begging the question. The liar paradox states that a sentence that says "this sentence is false" is either true or false. If the sentence is true, then it must be false, but if it is false, then it must be true. This creates an infinite loop of contradictions that cannot be resolved.

Similarly, Conee's argument creates an infinite loop of contradictions that cannot be resolved. The argument assumes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain the concept of properties, but this assumption is precisely what is being questioned. This creates a self-referential paradox that cannot be resolved.

There are alternative explanations for the concept of properties that do not rely on the existence of universals. For example, some philosophers argue that properties are simply a matter of language and convention. According to this view, properties are not objective features of the world, but rather a way of describing the world that is imposed by our language and culture.

In conclusion, Earl Conee's argument for the existence of universals is not as convincing as it seems. The argument relies on a series of assumptions and inferences that are not necessarily justified, and it begs the question by assuming the truth of the very thing it is trying to prove. There are alternative explanations for the concept of properties that do not rely on the existence of universals, and these alternatives should be considered when evaluating Conee's argument.

  • Conee, E., & Sider, T. (2019). Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
  • Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
  • Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell.
  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Explanation of Our Experience of the World. Oxford University Press.
    Q&A: Does Earl Conee's Argument about the Existence of Universals Beg the Question?

In our previous article, we examined Earl Conee's argument for the existence of universals and determined that it begs the question. However, we understand that this topic can be complex and may raise many questions. In this article, we will address some of the most frequently asked questions about Conee's argument and the concept of universals.

A: Universals are abstract entities that are thought to exist independently of individual objects. They are often referred to as properties, relations, or concepts. For example, the property of being red is a universal, as it can be attributed to many different objects, such as apples and roses.

A: The problem with Conee's argument is that it assumes the truth of the very thing it is trying to prove. In other words, it begs the question. Conee's argument assumes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain the concept of properties, but this assumption is precisely what is being questioned.

A: There are several alternative explanations for the concept of properties that do not rely on the existence of universals. For example, some philosophers argue that properties are simply a matter of language and convention. According to this view, properties are not objective features of the world, but rather a way of describing the world that is imposed by our language and culture.

A: The liar paradox is a classic example of a self-referential paradox that can be used to illustrate the problem of begging the question. The liar paradox states that a sentence that says "this sentence is false" is either true or false. If the sentence is true, then it must be false, but if it is false, then it must be true. This creates an infinite loop of contradictions that cannot be resolved.

Similarly, Conee's argument creates an infinite loop of contradictions that cannot be resolved. The argument assumes that the existence of universals is necessary to explain the concept of properties, but this assumption is precisely what is being questioned. This creates a self-referential paradox that cannot be resolved.

A: If Conee's argument is flawed, then it has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. It suggests that the concept of universals is not as well-established as previously thought, and that alternative explanations for the concept of properties may be more plausible.

A: Accepting alternative explanations for the concept of properties could have significant consequences for our understanding of the nature of reality. For example, it could lead to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between language and reality, and could challenge traditional notions of objectivity and truth.

A: There are several potential areas of research that could be explored in light of Conee's argument being flawed. For example, researchers could investigate alternative explanations for the concept of properties, or explore the implications of Conee's argument for our understanding of the nature of reality.

In conclusion, Earl Conee's argument for the existence of universals is not as convincing as it seems. The argument relies on a series of assumptions and inferences that are not necessarily justified, and it begs the question by assuming the truth of the very thing it is trying to prove. There are alternative explanations for the concept of properties that do not rely on the existence of universals, and these alternatives should be considered when evaluating Conee's argument.

  • Conee, E., & Sider, T. (2019). Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
  • Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
  • Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell.
  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Explanation of Our Experience of the World. Oxford University Press.